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TO BE OR NOT TO BE: EXAMINING THE RIGHT
TO DIE
Though shalt not kill; but needest not strive officiously to keep alive.
A.H. Clough,
The Latest Decalouge (1863)
Today, modern medicine has become able not only to extend life, but to
alter its very nature. The use of extraordinary medical means to prolong life has
led society only recently to consider a host of issues unknown to the generations
before us. In the seminal case of In re Quinlan,' the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated that, "the law, equity and justice must not themselves quail and be helpless
in the face of modern technological marvels presenting questions hitherto un-
thought of."2 More and more, however, these issues are being thought of and
thought of quite deeply.
This Note will examine the "right to die" 3 controversy. It will briefly outline
the developments with respect to the competent patient's right to refuse medical
treatment. This Note will then focus on the more controversial and value-laden
issues regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment. This note specifically
addresses how the law attempts to deal with the incompetent individual who is
unable to determine his or her own fate yet fails to meet the brain death criteria.4
Most significantly, it will examine the impact of the Supreme Court decision,
and subsequent judicial opinions, which allowed Nancy Cruzan's parents to end
her life. Finally, it will analyze the future of the right to die issue and the legacy
of the Cruzan family's struggle to allow their daughter to "die with dignity."
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO DIE
There has been a dichotomy of opinion and results concerning the two
distinct fact situations in the right to die cases. In the first situation, the patient
is competent to make his own decision.' In the second situation, the patient is
deemed incompetent and a court appointed guardian seeks a court order that
would empower him to make all medical decisions for the patient.6
1. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1977).
2. Id. at 665.
3. The term "Right to Die," as used in the context of this Note, specifically refers to the right
to refuse or to terminate treatment. I reject the notion that any such right should include the right
to kill oneself or to assist another in killing herself.
4. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
5. See, e.g. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 91984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd., 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978).
6. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In
re Torres, 357 N.W. 2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 457 A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.),
rev'd. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983); Leach v. Akron Gen.
Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
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In 1914, Justice Cardozo declared the modern philosophical foundation for
the respect of patient choice when he wrote, "every human being of adult-years
and-sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages."' Cardozo's words reflect one of
the earliest and arguably most persuasive opinions recognizing the importance of
the patient's right of self-determination.' He fashioned the remedy based on
assault and battery for those persons who were improperly given medical therapy
against their will. The right to accept or refuse medical treatment, therefore, has
its origins in the common law, serving to protect a person's interest in his or her
own bodily integrity. 9
Recently, however, the courts have turned from a battery theory toward a
negligence one, focusing on the patient's lack of informed consent as a basis for
action.' 0 Moreover, since 1973, the common law doctrine has been augmented
by a line of cases holding that the constitutional right of privacy is sufficiently
broad so as to cover medical treatment." If the competent adult patient consents
to the administration of treatment, such consent usually goes unquestioned and
the procedure is executed without further debate, ethically or legally.
7. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). Even prior to
Schloendorff, courts generally upheld a patient's battery action against a physician for unauthorized
treatment based upon the common law theories of fraud and misrepresentation. See, e.g., State v.
Housekeeper, 16 A. 382 (Md. 1889); W. Page Keeton, et. al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of
Torts, § 32, at 190-91 (5th. Ed. 1984).
8. Even earlier case law recognizing a patient's right to be free from unwanted health care
treatment exists. See Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
9. The wording used by many of the courts in these earlier cases reflects the influence on the
notions of liberty and the individual espoused by John Stuart Mill. See, e.g., Mill's well-known
postulate that "[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." John
Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill 129 (New. Am. Libr. ed. 1968).
10. The Doctrine of Informed Consent dictates that:
Surgeons and other doctors are .. .required to provide their patients with sufficient
information to permit the patient himself to make an informed and intelligent decision
to submit to a proposed course of treatment or surgical procedure. Such a disclosure
should include the nature of the pertinent ailment or condition, the risks of the proposed
treatment or procedure, and the risks of any alternative methods of treatment, including
the risks of failing to undergo any treatment at all.
Keeton et. al., Supra note 6, § 32.
The foundation for the doctrine of informed consent was laid in the 1957 case of Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). Here,
the court held that "[al physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if
he withholds any facts which are necessary to the proposed treatment." 317 P.2d at 181.
See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), (applying District of Columbia Law),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); David W. Louisell & Harold Williams, Medical Malpractice §
22.01 at 594.44 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), wherein Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, declared: "The right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
See also In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623-24 (1973) (upholding the right of a state mental
institution inmate to refuse surgery for breast cancer):
[Tihe constitutional right of privacy includes the right of a mature competent adult
patient to refuse to accept medical recommendations that may prolong one's life ...
in short, the right of privacy includes the right to die.
The Right to Die
In the situations wherein a patient refuses to give his or her consent to
important or life sustaining treatment, however, the courts have been somewhat
reluctant to yield total authority. Thus, a competent patient's decision to accept
or refuse medical care sometimes has been overridden. These cases typically
involve a determination that the state's interest in preserving life is paramount
to the individual's right to privacy 2 and to the protection of dependent minors, 3
either directly or indirectly.
Thus, with respect to the right of the competent adult patient to refuse any
life-sustaining treatment, the debate usually focuses on the conflicting interests
of the state and the individual. Generally, in deciding whether to allow a patient
to refuse medical care, the courts will carefully consider a number of factors
including: the degree to which the patient is suffering, the patient's chance of
survival with such extraordinary care, and the existence of dependents.
Thus far, based on constitutional, legislative and judicial precedent, the
courts have presumed that the adult competent patient does indeed have a right
to refuse life-sustaining care.
II. THE RIGHTS OF THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT
A. The Case of Karen Ann Quinlan
The question of whether life-support equipment may be withdrawn from an
incompetent, comatose patient was first addressed in the landmark case of In re
Quinlan.'4 Karen Quinlan, age 20, tragically suffered a cardiac arrest that led to
the destruction of much of her brain tissue. At the emergency room, the doctors
resuscitated her and kept her major organs performing by use of a highly advanced
life support machine. Though technically "alive," doctors diagnosed her as being
in a "chronic persistent vegetative state."' 5
Karen Quinlan laid in a New Jersey hospital with no reasonable chance for
recovery and without the ability to make any treatment decisions for herself.
Karen's father sought to be appointed his daughter's guardian and requested the
12. E.g., John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971) (treatment ordered
to save patient's life despite known objects based on religious beliefs).
13. Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S.
978 (1964). In this case, physicians at the Georgetown University Medical Center applied to the
federal district court for permission to administer a blood transfusion to a patient. The Court of
Appeals reviewed the district court's order so authorizing the hospital to administer the needed blood
transfusions to a patient who opposed the procedure on religious grounds, and whose husband was
unwilling to authorize the procedure. The court found the order proper because, inter alia, the
patient was the mother of a seven-month old child, and the state as "parens patria" would not allow
the parent to abandon the child, even on religious grounds, 331 F.2d 1008.
14. 355 A.2d 647.
15. 355 A.2d at 654. The chronic persistent vegetative state is a phrase that describes a body
"[w]hich is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains
heart beat and pulminary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of
muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either
self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner." In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,
438 (N.J. 1987).
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court's permission to have her respirator removed.' 6 With this petition before
them, the New Jersey Supreme Court faced the ultimate question of whether an
incompetent patient has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The court
held that Mr. Quinlan should be his daughter's guardian and should also be
permitted to have her respirator removed, even though the justices realized that
such action would in all likelihood cause Karen to die.'
7
The most important aspect of the Quinlan opinion was the court's holding
that an incompetent person's right to refuse medical therapy is grounded in the
right to privacy.Is Moreover, the exercise of Karen's constitutional right here
could not be waived merely because she lost conscious function.' 9 In so ruling,
the court expounded a test which has come to be known as the "Substituted
Judgment Test." Its name derives from the premise that the court appointed
guardian would exercise the patient's rights, protecting his or her rights, thereby,
effectively allowing the guardian to "don the mental mantle of the incompetent." 20
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court first announced the "Substituted
Judgment Test," many other states have dealt with the rights of incompetent
individuals to discontinue the use of life support mechanisms. Most have followed
the rationale which the New Jersey Supreme Court announced in Quinlan and
have adopted the substituted judgment test. 2' Other states, however, have turned
to a more objective means of implementing a balancing test. 22
16. Id. at 657.
The lower court had appointed neither Mr. nor Mrs. Quinlan as their daughter's guardian,
because it believed their personal anguish would prevent them from effectively making day-to-day
decisions on the future care and treatment of Karen. 348 A.2d 801, 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975), rev'd., 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
17. 355 A.2d at 671-72. The court deemed Mr. Quinlan capable of full guardianship because
"his strength of purpose and character" far outweighed his feelings of grief and sorrow. The court
noted, however, that the decision to terminate life support mechanisms would require the consensus
of "the guardian and family of [the patient], the responsible attending physicians and the hospital's
ethics committee." Id. at 671.72.
These entities did reach a consensus of opinion and decided that it was in Karen's best interests
to have her respirator removed. Karen survived the removal of life-support systems but remained in
a deep coma. Her parents did not seek to have her nutrition and hydration discontinued. She died
on June 11, 1985. Andrew H. Malcom, The End of the Quinlan Case, but Not the Issue It Raised,
N.Y. Times, June 16, 1985, at D22.
18. The court found that the privacy right is "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy in certain circumstances." Id. at 663 (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
This constitutional right announced in Quinlan is not absolute; it must be weighed against several
countervailing state interests, including:
1) the interest in the preservation of life;
2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties;
3) the prevention of suicide; and
4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
19. 355 A. 2d at 663.
20. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1971)
(quoting In re Carson, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1962)).
21. See e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass.
1977) (holding that all persons, whether competent or incompetent, have a right to refuse medical
treatment in certain instances based on its application of the Quinlan court's rationale).
22. Courts have adopted two further alternative approaches to the "substituted judgment test"
to enable decision making for incompetent patients.
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Throughout this emotional debate the United States Supreme Court has
remained silent on the right to die controversy, refusing to grant certiorari in a
number of cases.2" The High Court appeared satisfied to defer judgment on the
issues to the state courts. That was until another young woman, this time in
Missouri, slipped into the persistent vegetative state after a tragic automobile
accident. The litigation which ensued led to a series of judicial decisions reaching,
though not culminating, in an extensive opinion by the United States Supreme
Court.2 4
B. The Case of Nancy Beth Cruzan
"The court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds that the intent of ...
[Nancy Cruzan], if mentally able, would be to terminate her nutrition and
hydration."25 With those words, a county probate judge in Missouri empowered
Nancy Cruzan's parents to remove the gastrointestinal tube which had provided
her food and water for nearly eight years. On December 26, 1990, on the twelfth
day after the feeding and hydration tube had been removed from her stomach,
Nancy Beth Cruzan died, bringing an end to the nation's foremost right to die
case.
It all began on January 11, 1983, when Nancy was an unknown twenty-five
year old woman returning home in her old Nash Rambler from a night shift job
at a cheese factory. Her car veered out of control on an icy two lane road and
she was thrown thirty-five feet forward into a ditch. When paramedics arrived,
they discovered her without any respiratory nor cardiac function. After restoring
her heartbeat and breathing, the paramedics rushed Nancy to a hospital. Having
been deprived of oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes, she suffered permanent
and extensive brain damage.26 After three weeks in a deep coma, she progressed
to a persistent vegetative state, a condition from which she never recovered.
Though doctors agreed that she had no chance of regaining her mental
facilities, they also determined that she was not brain dead. 27 Nevertheless,
Nancy's parents, recognizing that their daughter would not want to continue
living in this vegetative state, petitioned the state trial court for permission to
1) Limited Objective Test: This test allows the discontinuation of care when there is
not enough evidence to survive the substituted judgment test. It represents a relaxation
of the stringent clear and convincing standard that must be met under the substituted
judgment test. For an example of this test, see In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984).
2) Pure Objective Test: This test is a balancing test that weighs the benefits and burdens
encountered by the incompetent individual, thus allowing the judge to order a discon-
tinuation of medical therapy. It is applied when the prognosis of continued incompetence
is certain, and the patient never indicated any preference whether to be maintained in
such a condition. For an example of this test, see In re peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J.
1987).
23. See e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987), stay denied sub nom., Lincoln Park Nursing
and Convalescent Home v. Kahn 483 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1987).
24. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, et. al., 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
25. Order issued by Judge Charles Teel of the Jasper County Missouri Probate Court, December
12, 1990. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al.
26. 110 S. Ct. at 2844-46.
27. See supra note 3.
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terminate her artificial hydration and nutrition." The court found that Nancy
had a fundamental right under the state and federal constitutions to refuse such
extraordinary care.2 9 Having found that Nancy did indeed, while competent,
express a desire to die if she were ever to enter a persistent vegetative state, the
court granted the Cruzan's request.30
The Missouri Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the lower
court. " In so doing, the court, sitting en banc, ruled that the Cruzans may not
cause their daughter's feeding tube to be removed, concluding that "no person
can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities
required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing,
inherently reliable evidence absent here.''32 Accordingly, the Missouri Rehabili-
tation Hospital continued to provide Nancy Cruzan with food and water by way
of the gastrointestinal tube, despite the claims of her parents and others that this
prolonged care is not what Nancy would have wanted.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question
of whether Cruzan has a right under the U.S. Constitution which would require
the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circum-
stances.33 In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
affirmed by a 5-4 vote the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court. The Chief
Justice recognized the long-standing common law right to refuse medical treat-
ment.3 4 Moreover, he explicitly announced that a competent patient has a Con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse
unwanted medical therapy. This right, he acknowledged, included not only the
ability to refuse advanced technological care, but also to refuse mere food and
water by way of artificial hydration and nutrition. 6
The Chief Justice, however, narrowed the issue in the case to whether the
United States Constitution forbids Missouri from requiring that evidence of the
incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. He reasoned that Missouri's interest in protecting life was
sufficiently important so as to permit this heightened evidentiary standard. 7
Furthermore, the majority held that the Missouri Supreme Court did not commit
constitutional error in reversing the trial court's determination that such clear
and convincing evidence was absent.3"
The Court also rejected the Cruzan's alternative plea that Missouri must
accept the substituted judgment of close family members even in the absence of
substantial proof that their views reflect the view of the patient. The Cruzan's
28. Courts have generally rejected any distinction between artificial feeding and other, more
traditional forms of medical treatment. See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990); Rasmussen
v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 974 (Me. 1987).
29. Cruzan v. Hartman, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
30. Id.
31. Id., at 427.
32. Id., at 425.
33. 110 S. Ct. at 2841.
34. Id., at 2846-47.
35. Id., at 2851-52.
36. Id.
37. Id., 2852-53.
38. Id. at 2853.
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argued that the Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of a State's
scheme favoring the exercise of family decision making. 9 The majority refused,
however, to extend a decision which allowed a State to rely on family decision
making into a constitutional requirement mandating the States to recognize and
defer exclusively to such decisionmaking.4 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, effectively denying the Cruzan
family the right to terminate the life of their daughter, Nancy. The litigation in
this matter, however, was not over.
Some five weeks after the Supreme Court opinion in Cruzan was published,
the Cruzans asked Missouri County Probate Judge Charles Teel for a second
hearing, saying they had new evidence that their daughter once indicated to three
people that she would rather die than live in her present condition.4 ' After a
series of hearings, Judge Teel, in a brief opinion, found this new evidence to be
credible and that it proves Nancy's intention to a clear and convincing degree.
42
The State Attorney General's Office declined to appeal the Judge's decision.
Within twenty four hours, Nancy's parents ordered hospital officials to discon-
tinue her feeding and hydration and let her die, ending Nancy's eight year
existence, removed from the world around her.
III. THE LEGACY OF NANCY CRUZAN AND THE FUTURE OF THE
RIGHT TO DIE
It is one of the great unanticipated ironies of modern society that the more
capable medical technology becomes at reducing health problems and prolonging
life, the more we must decide when to prevent that very same technology from
unnecessarily prolonging the process of death. 43 For most of America, Nancy
Cruzan became an enduring symbol of this conflict of divergent interests. In the
end, her family's struggle to have her treatment terminated achieved some
remarkable results.
With its decision in the Cruzan case, 44 the Supreme Court has again deferred
to the States on what truly is an issue of life and death. Grounded in a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest, the Court has, however, recognized the competent
patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 45 Thus, while not affecting their
daughter, the Cruzan's have prompted a Supreme Court decision that explicitly
39. Id. at 2854.
40. Id.
41. The new evidence, presented to Judge Teel in November, 1990, -included testimony from two
women who had worked with Cruzan at a small school for deaf and blind children in 1978. They
learned of her plight through the publicity generated by the case. Both women told of specific
conversations they had had with Cruzan about death and dying, including one in which she agreed
that, if she became a "vegetable," she would not want to be fed by force or kept alive by machines.
Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec.
27, 1990, at Al.
42. Traditionally, the measure of proof in civil cases is by a preponderance of the evidence.
Missouri, however, requires decisions concerning the termination of any life support to be by a clear
and convincing degree. See Edward W. Cleary et al., McCormick on Evidence §340 (3d Ed. 1984).
43. Andrew H. Malcolm, What Medical Science Can't Seem to Learn: When to Call It Quits,
N.Y. Times, December 23, 1990, at D6.
44. 110 S. Ct. at 2841.
45. Id., at 2846-47.
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acknowledges a person's right to refuse medical intervention to prolong his or
her life.
More importantly, the case of Nancy Cruzan has brought to the forefront
of American thought the reality of what modern medicine can achieve. The
highly publicized struggle of Nancy Cruzan's parents will leave a legacy that lives
far beyond is effects on their daughter. For many persons, Nancy came to
represent the unintended consequences of advanced medical technology, a tech-
nology that has come to view death as a failure. In essence, the Cruzan's long
battle, like the Quinlan's before them, has served to educate an entire nation
about the complexities that comprise the debate over the right to die. Nancy
Cruzan's fate made many persons, lawyers and doctors, bioethicists and the
clergy, and of course, the "common man," talk openly about the quality of life
and the extent to which they would choose, if competent, to have their lives
prolonged .6
The case has highlighted the importance of leaving written instructions,
including living wills and durable power of attorney documents, for relatives and
doctors to follow in the event of an incapacitating illness or injury. Moreover,
the case has spurred, in part, the Congress of the United States to enact the
"Patient Self-Determination Act." 47 This legislation requires hospitals and nursing
homes which receive federal funds to explain to patients their right to refuse
medical treatment.
These positive effects on American society notwithstanding, the Cruzan's
were unable to persuade the United States Supreme Court to state that there is
a constitutional basis requiring States to adopt one particular method for deciding
whether to terminate medical care for the incompetent patient. 4 This decision by
the Court seems justified. It will remove from potential litigants the ability to
have their causes argued on constitutional grounds. The net effect should be a
greater freedom for the States to formulate their own measures and public policies
for dealing with the myriad of issues" regarding the decision whether to terminate
care for the incompetent individual.
In the final analysis, the results of the medical profession's quest to advance
technology for the betterment and advancement of all the world's people's
represents one of the great advancements of modern society. The physicians and
technicians of today ought to receive our deepest and most sincere gratitude for
their efforts.
At the same time, we must respect the very difficult and personal decisions
of a permanently incompetent patient's guardian 0 who must decide when, if
46. Shortly after Nancy's death, a spokesman for the Society for the Right to Die observed,
"The Cruzan case has focused national attention on this issue in an unprecedented way. While it's
been a horrible agony for the Cruzans ... we owe them a debt for educating us and giving so much
impetus to living wills and legislation that helps people plan ahead." Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan
Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. Times, December 27, 990, at Al.
47. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 stat. 1388
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
48. 110 S.Ct. at 2854.
49. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING
TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, 16-18 (1983).
50. The family members of the incompetent patient are the most appropriate individuals to serve
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ever, medical intervention no longer comports with the patient's previously
expressed desires and intentions with respect to her "right to die." Moreover, in
the absence of any such previous expressions of intent, we must respect the
guardian's decisions concerning what the patient's choice would have been in
light of that patient's moral attitudes, ethical beliefs and value system. Whether
the guardian's decisions are justified, and the degree to which such justification
should be judged, is a decision that is best left to the individual states to decide."
Nonetheless, as a result of Nancy Cruzan's ordeal and her family's efforts on
her behalf, "hundreds of thousands of people can rest free, knowing that when
death beckons, they can meet it face to face with dignity, free from the fear of
unwanted and useless medical treatment. '"s2
John F. Crowley*
in this guardianship capacity based on their unique relationship with the patient and special insight
into the patient's likely choices. One commentator has noted that:
Not only are family members most likely to be privy to any relevant statements that patients have
made on the topics of treatment or its termination, but they also have longstanding knowledge of
the patient's character traits. Although evidence of character traits may seem inconclusive to third
parties, closely related persons may, quite legitimately, "just know" what the patient would want in
a way that transcends purely logical evidence. Longstanding knowledge, love, and intimacy make
family members the best candidates for implementing the patient's probable wishes and upholding
her values." Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 438 (1988).
51. For a discussion of the constitutional bases and approaches that states might employ in
reaching such decisions, See, generally Maryn and Bourguignon, Coming to Terms with Death: The
Cruzan Case, 42 Hastings L.J. 817 (1991).
52. Don Colburn, When to Let Death Come, Washington Post, January 1, 1991, at ZI.
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 1989; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1992.
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